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INSURANCE- AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT RULES THAT
A HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD'S LIABILITY UNDER THE FAMILY
CAR DOCTRINE IS NOT NECESSARILY COVERED BY HIS
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICY
McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 623 N.W.2d 390
I. FACTS
Curtis and Debra Tufty, residents of Gwinner, North Dakota, renewed
their automobile insurance policy with AMCO Insurance Company
(AMCO) in September 1994.1 They purchased the policy through Brian
Orn of the Forman Insurance and Real Estate Company. 2 They insured a
1983 Ford van, a 1979 GMC pickup, and a 1983 Dodge four-door auto-
mobile under the policy. 3 The policy listed Travis, the Tufty's oldest son,
as an insured driver and the Tufty's other two children, Christopher and
Amanda, as members of the household not yet driving. 4 The policy insured
the Tuftys for liability up to $100,000 per person and $300,000 per
accident. 5 This policy was renewed until March 1995.6
In April 1994, sixteen-year-old Christopher Tufty obtained his driver's
license, and Curtis Tufty purchased a 1978. Ford pickup for him. 7 This
pickup was added to the Tuftys' AMCO policy, but was dropped from
coverage when its engine failed in June 1994.8 Curtis Tufty then purchased
a 1973 Pontiac LeMans for Christopher with a $650 check from his
personal checking account.9 The Tuftys attempted to add this vehicle to
1. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 2, 623 N.W.2d 390, 392. The policy was originally pur-
chased on March 24, 1993. Brief for Appellee at 1, McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 623 N.W.2d
390 (No. 20000047).
2. Appellee's Brief at 1, McPhee (No. 20000047).





8. Id. Debra Tufty contacted Orn to add the pickup to the AMCO policy, and it was added
on May 25, 1994. Id. However, the driver information on the insurance application form for the
pickup was left blank. Brief for Appellee at 1, McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 623 N.W.2d 390
(No. 20000047).
9. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 4, 623 N.W.2d 390, 392. Christopher Tufty did not have
a checking account, but contended that he paid his father back for the vehicle with money he had
saved from working part-time during school and full-time during the summer. Id. It was unclear
whether Christopher actually paid his father back for the car because he originally testified in a
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their AMCO policy but could not because it was discovered, upon Orn's re-
quest for Christopher's driving record, that Christopher had been convicted
of driving without a license and fleeing a police officer in 1993.10 The
Tuftys then insured the Pontiac with Farm & City, a high-risk insurer, for
liability up to $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident." The policy
listed Curtis Tufty as the owner and Christopher Tufty as an operator.12
Orn opened separate files for the AMCO policy and the Farm & City
policy, but Curtis Tufty paid the premiums for each. 13
Christopher subsequently became dissatisfied with the Pontiac's gas
mileage, and Curtis purchased a 1976 Toyota Corolla for him with a
personal check on November 11, 1994.14 This purchase was not reported to
Orn, AMCO, or Farm & City.15 On November 27, 1994, Christopher Tufty
was driving the Toyota when it slid through a stop sign and collided with
another vehicle.16 Sandra McPhee, a passenger in the Toyota with
Christopher, was killed as a result of the collision. 17
That night, Debra Tufty called Orn and informed him that they had
bought a new car for Christopher, that the car was involved in an accident
while Christopher was driving, and that a passenger was killed.18 Orn filed
a log entry' 9 of this conversation in the Tuftys' AMCO file and in their
Farm & City file; however, he only sent a loss notice to Farm & City.20
deposition that he repaid his father with money from his savings account. Appellee's Brief at 2,
McPhee (No. 20000047). However, he later testified that he paid his father with cash that he kept
in his bedroom. Id. Furthermore, Christopher never had more than $124.32 in his savings account
at any time. Id. at 6.
10. McPhee, 5, 623 N.W.2d at 392.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 392-93.
14. Brief for Appellant at 8, McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 623 N.W.2d 390 (No.
20000047). The title to the Toyota was never registered and was thrown away so it was unclear
whom the Tuftys indicated as the registered owner of the vehicle. Appellee's Brief at 7, McPhee
(No. 20000047). Inconsistencies in Christopher's testimony made it unclear whether he repaid
Curtis for the purchase of the Toyota. Id. at 6.




19. The log entry stated:
Debra called this evening to tell us that their son, Christopher[,] was involved in an
accident east of Gwinner. He had 3 other passengers with him and slid on ice through
an intersection and 1 of the occupants was killed. She also said that they had
purchased a different car for Chris on Nov. 12, 1994. The other passengers were also
hurt, however, none were injured severely. The driver of the other auto was not hurt.
20. Id.
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Christopher Tufty was never listed as a driver under the AMCO poli-
cy. 21 AMCO had requested information regarding the status of Christopher
Tufty as a driver during the summer of 1994.22 However, Orn never
responded to this request, and therefore, AMCO was not aware of
Christopher's status as a driver. 23 On November 29, 1994, Orn finally sent
AMCO the information it had requested regarding Christopher Tufty.24
Upon receiving this information, AMCO changed Christopher's status
under the policy to omit him as a household member not driving. 25 Curtis
Tufty then removed himself from the Farm & City policy in January 1995.26
In March 1995, AMCO changed the Tufty's policy again, this time to list
Christopher as an excluded driver.27 Then, on November 7, 1996, Orn sent
a loss notice to AMCO regarding the accident that killed Sandra McPhee. 28
Curtis and Debra Tufty's AMCO policy provided:
[AMCO] will pay damages for 'bodily injury' or 'property dam-
age' for which any 'insured' becomes legally responsible because
of an auto accident. [The policy defined "insured" as] you and any
'family member' for the ownership, maintenance or use ... of any
auto.... [However, the policy excluded coverage] for the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of ... any vehicle, other than 'your
covered auto,' which is... owned by any 'family member'; or...
furnished or available for the regular use of any 'family member.'
[But], this exclusion does not apply to your maintenance or use of
any vehicle which is ... owned by a 'family member'; or...
furnished or available for the regular use of a 'family member.' 29
The policy also contained a newly acquired vehicle clause, which covered a
vehicle acquired during the policy period if an insured requested coverage
within thirty days of becoming the owner. 30
In March 1998, Sandra McPhee's parents, Lory and Roy McPhee, filed
a wrongful death claim against Curtis and Christopher Tufty. 31 The parties
21. Brief for Appellant at 10, McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 623 N.W.2d 390 (No.
20000047).
22. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 6, 623 N.W.2d 390, 393.
23. Id.
24. Id. 9 9.
25. Id.
26. Id. As a result, Christopher Tufty was the only driver listed on the Farm & City
insurance policy for the Pontiac. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. 91 23, 623 N.W.2d at 395-96.
30. Id. 1 36, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
31. Id. 1 10, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
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entered into a Miller-Shugart agreement, 32 whereby Christopher and Curtis
Tufty admitted liability in the amount of $124,000, but required the
McPhees to recover from AMCO or Farm & City if either policy actually
covered the collision. 33 Farm & City satisfied $24,000 of the judgment
under its policy, leaving the McPhees to seek the remaining $100,000 from
AMCO.34 AMCO and the McPhees stipulated that AMCO would be added
to the action by service of a garnishment complaint and that the court would
determine whether AMCO's policy covered the accident.35
The trial court held that the Toyota driven by Christopher Tufty was
covered under the AMCO policy and that Curtis Tufty was liable based on
the family car doctrine.36 Furthermore, the trial court determined that the
newly acquired vehicle clause in the insurance contract was satisfied when
Debra Tufty contacted Orn on the night of the accident. 37 The trial court
entered an amended judgment in favor of the McPhees and AMCO ap-
pealed. 38 The North Dakota Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that
Curtis Tufty was vicariously liable based on the family car doctrine,39 that
Christopher's unrestricted use of the vehicle was not a "use" by Curtis
under the language of the AMCO policy, 40 and that the communication be-
tween Debra Tufty and Brian Om on the night of the accident was insuffici-
ent as a matter of law to constitute notice of a newly acquired vehicle under
the AMCO policy.4 1
32. Id. Under a Miller-Shugart agreement, the parties to an action stipulate that any judg-
ment awarded may only be collected from an insurance policy. Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d
729, 732 (Minn. 1982). This judgment is not conclusive on an insurer, and the plaintiff still has
the burden to show that the settlement was reasonable and prudent. See McPhee v. Tufty, 2001
ND 51, 10, 623 N.W.2d 390, 393 n.l (citing Rebel v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 1998 ND 194, 91 5,
585 N.W.2d 811, 812 & n.1).
33. McPhee, 10, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 393-94.
36. Id. at 394. The family car doctrine makes the owner of a vehicle vicariously liable for its
negligent use by a driver using the vehicle with the owner's consent for the business or pleasure of
the owner's family. Staroba v. Heitkamp, 338 N.W.2d 640, 641 (N.D. 1983).
37. McPhee, 1 35, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
38. Id. 9f 1, 623 N.W.2d at 392.
39. Id. 9[ 19, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
40. Id. 9f 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398.




North Dakota law requires all automobiles to carry certain levels of
insurance. 42 The levels set are minimum amounts, and greater protection
can be purchased if desired. 43 The purpose of these financial responsibility
laws is to ensure that innocent victims of automobile accidents do not face
financial disaster.44 The family car doctrine is a common law doctrine with
a similar policy of providing a financially responsible defendant to an
innocent victim of an automobile accident.45
A. THE FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE
The family car doctrine, also called the family purpose doctrine, makes
the owner of a vehicle vicariously liable for its negligent use by a driver
using the vehicle with the owner's consent and for the business or pleasure
of the owner's family. 46 The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that a per-
son who has been injured by a financially irresponsible defendant can seek
relief from a financially responsible defendant. 47
North Dakota adopted the family car doctrine in 1919.48 It has become
a firmly established doctrine of law in North Dakota.49 North Dakota's
family car doctrine is based on the respondeat superior theory of the master-
42. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-1 1(2)(b) (1997) (mandating that every vehicle carry lia-
bility coverage of at least $25,000 for damages due to personal injury or death of one person in
any accident).
43. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11(7) (allowing insurance companies to provide
coverage over and above the minimum amount required by the financial responsibility laws).
44. See Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 882 (N.D. 1975) (stating
"[t]he basic purpose for the Legislature's enactment of financial responsibility laws was to protect
innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial disaster").
45. Michaelson v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571, 573-74 (N.D. 1962), overruled on other grounds,
Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728, 730 (N.D. 1991).
46. Staroba v. Heitkamp, 338 N.W.2d 640, 641 (N.D. 1983). In Staroba, Jerome Heitkamp's
unmarried eighteen-year-old son, Richard, was involved in an automobile accident that killed the
plaintiff's husband, Arlyn Staroba. Id. Richard was driving a pickup that was registered in Jer-
ome's name to check his animal traps at the time of the accident. Id. at 642. The court held that
the family car doctrine made Jerome vicariously liable for Richard's use of the vehicle because
Jerome had legal title, purchased, depreciated, insured, and retained control of the vehicle. Id. at
643. The Staroba court was also influenced by the fact that Richard lived with his parents at the
time of the accident and had authorization to use the pickup. Id.
47. Michaelson, 113 N.W.2d at 573-74. The policy behind the family car doctrine was an
extension of the previously established rule of liability that a person who allowed another to use
his or her vehicle was more at fault than an innocent victim and should bear the loss. Id.
48. See Ulman v. Lindeman, 176 N.W. 25, 25 (N.D. 1919) (holding that an owner of an auto-
mobile was liable for its negligent operation by a third party because of the master-servant rela-
tionship); see also Staroba, 338 N.W.2d at 641 (stating that the family car doctrine was adopted in
North Dakota by the court in Ulman).
49. Schobinger, 467 N.W.2d at 729.
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servant relationship. 50 The liability exists because the automobile was be-
ing used in furtherance of a family purpose and not because the driver and
the head of household5l are related. 52 Merely having a familial relationship
does not mandate that the doctrine will apply to a given situation.53 Fur-
thermore, it is unnecessary for the head of household to hold legal title to
the vehicle; it is only necessary for him 54 to furnish the vehicle to the
driver.55
Whether the family car doctrine applies to a particular situation is a
question of fact and is determined by the relationship between the head of
household and the driver. 56 There is a wide range of circumstances that af-
fect whether the doctrine applies.57 The following are some of the common
factors evaluated: who paid for the car, who controlled the use of the car,
what the parties intended when the car was purchased or sold, who the
parties intended to be the owner of the car, who the car was delivered to
when purchased, and who exercised the property rights in the car.58 These
factors are then applied to each independent situation, and the less pro-
prietary interest that the head of household has in the vehicle, the less likely
the family car doctrine will apply.59 If the doctrine applies, it makes the
50. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 455 (N.D. 1979). The master-servant relation-
ship is an agency law concept that makes a master vicariously liable to third persons for the negli-
gent acts of his or her servant while transacting the business of the agency. N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-
03-09 (1987).
51. A head of household is the person "who maintains [a] car for the general use and con-
venience of his family." Carpenter v. Dunnell, 237 N.W. 779, 780 (N.D. 1931). The family
includes all those who have general authority to use the car and for whose use the vehicle is
maintained. Id.
52. Herman, 277 N.W.2d at 455.
53. Id. at 456, 461. The Herman court determined that the family car doctrine does not apply
to a situation just because a father-son relationship existed because it "would discourage normal,
desirable interaction between family members who have severed, for purposes of the [family car]
doctrine, the fictitious agency relationship that formerly existed between them." Id. at 461.
54. The male pronoun is used to refer to the head of household throughout this comment
because the head of household in McPhee was male. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 1, 623
N.W.2d 390, 392.
55. Id. at 458.
56. Id. at 455.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 459; see also, e.g., Staroba v. Heitkamp, 338 N.W.2d 640, 643 (N.D. 1983) (ex-
tending liability to the father of the driver at fault in an automobile accident when the father had
legal title, purchased, depreciated, insured, and retained control of the vehicle).
59. Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 459 n.22 (N.D. 1979) (stating that "[a]s the
situation moves away from existence of a proprietary interest held by the parent after the transfer,
or toward the existence of an arm's-length business relationship during the transfer, application of
the doctrine becomes less likely").
[VOL. 78:479
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head of household liable for damages arising out of the driver's negligent
use of the vehicle.60
A head of household may wish to insure against liability under the
family car doctrine because he may be liable for damages that arise due to
the use of a vehicle he has furnished to another.61 Whether an insurance
policy provides coverage for liability is determined by contract law.62
B. DETERMINATION OF COVERAGE UNDER INSURANCE POLICIES
The main consideration in determining whether an insurance policy
provides coverage in a given situation is the contract language. 63 The lan-
guage of an insurance contract is given its commonly accepted meaning,
and if a term is clear on its face, the courts will not reconstruct it.64 If it is
determined as a matter of law that a term in a policy is ambiguous, the term
will be construed in favor of the insured. 65 In order for an insured's policy
that only covers liability for the insured's use of the vehicle to cover dam-
ages caused by a third party using the insured's vehicle, the vehicle must
have been operated for some "use" of the insured.66 An insured will be
considered to have been "using" a vehicle as defined in an insurance
contract if "use" under the policy is found to be ambiguous because
ambiguities in insurance contracts are interpreted in favor of the insured.67
1. The Definition of "Use"
The term "use" is given its ordinary meaning 68 and is generally
interpreted broadly in insurance contracts. 69 It has been described as "the
60. See Staroba, 338 N.W.2d at 641 (stating that the family car doctrine is an extension of
the respondeat superior theory of liability). Respondeat superior is defined as "holding an em-
ployer or principal liable for the employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope
of the employment or agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1313 (7th ed. 1999).
61. Staroba, 338 N.W.2d at 641.
62. See Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Jordan, 315 N.W.2d 290, 294 (N.D. 1982) (stating that
principles of contract law apply to insurance policies).
63. DeCoteau v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 ND 3, 19, 603 N.W.2d 906, 913.
64. Center Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 2000 ND 192, 14, 618 N.W.2d 505, 510.
65. Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 1998 ND 109, 6, 579 N.W.2d 599, 602. Ambigui-
ty exists if reasonable arguments can be made that a term has two or more possible interpretations.
Id. 7 5.
66. See Thedin v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 703, 706 (N.D. 1994) (stating that
an insurance policy is interpreted according to the meaning of its provisions).
67. See Fisher, 6, 579 N.W.2d at 602 (determining that ambiguities in insurance policies
are construed in favor of the insured).
68. See Hanneman v. Cont'l W. Ins. Co., 1998 ND 46, 56, 575 N.W.2d 445, 455 & n.3
(Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 111:35 (3d ed. 1997))
(defining use as "employment of the automobile for some purpose of the user").
69. Woodrich Const. Co. v. Indem. Ins. Co., 89 N.W.2d 412, 418 (Minn. 1958).
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general catch-all of the insuring clause, designed and construed to include
all proper uses of the vehicle not falling within one of the previous terms of
definition."70 In North Dakota, use of an automobile has been determined
to be any use that "arises out of the inherent nature of the automobile."7'
Most jurisdictions have held that a person does not have to be physical-
ly present in an automobile to be using it.72 A two-factor test set out in
BATS, Inc. v. Shikuma73 is often used to determine 'whether a person not
driving a vehicle was using that vehicle.74 The two factors to consider
under this test are (1) whether the vehicle was under the supervision or con-
trol of the insured; and (2) whether the vehicle was being operated to serve
a purpose of the insured.75 If these two factors are met, a person who was
not driving a vehicle at the time of an accident will still be considered to
have been using it.76
Two cases that addressed whether a non-present insured was using a
vehicle at the time it was involved in an accident, but did not use the
Shikuma test, were Brabender v. Northern Assurance Co. of America77 and
Rogers v. MFA Mutual Insurance C0.78 In Brabender, Mary Brabender's
son was injured in an automobile collision while riding in a vehicle owned
by her daughter and driven by the family's nanny. 79 The nanny had been
instructed to bring the boy to a nail salon so Mrs. Brabender could spend
70. 6B APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4316 (1979).
71. Norgaard v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 871, 874 (N.D. 1972).
72. E.g., Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 52 F. Supp. 601, 603 (N.D. I11. 1943); Hertz Corp. v,
Amerisure Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. App. 1993); BATS, Inc. v. Shikuma, 617 P.2d 575,
577-78 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980); Royal Indem. Co. v. Shull, 665 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo. 1984); Hertz
Corp. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 250 A.D.2d 181, 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
73. 617 P.2d 575 (Haw. Ct. App. 1980).
74. Shikuma, 617 P.2d at 577. In Shikuma, the insured rented a van in order to help his
friend move. Id. at 576. When they were finished, the two agreed that the friend would return
home with the van and take it back to the rental company in the morning. Id. However, the friend
was injured in an automobile accident on the way home. Id. The friend was granted summary
judgment against the insured for damages he incurred in the accident, and the insured filed a third-
party claim against his own insurer seeking coverage for the judgment rendered against him. Id.
The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the insured was not using the vehicle at the time of
the accident. Id. The court determined that "use" was not ambiguous and set out the two-factor
test in order to determine whether a non-present insured was using a vehicle when a third party
was involved in an accident while driving it. Id. at 577. Since the friend was operating the
vehicle for the purpose of satisfying the insured's obligation under the rental agreement, the court
determined that the insured was using the vehicle and that his insurance company was obligated to
provide coverage for the accident. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. 65 F.3d 269 (2d Cir. 1995).
78. 554 S.W.2d 327 (Ark. 1977).
79. Brabender, 65 F.3d at 271. In a separate action, the son's father sought damages from
the nanny, his daughter, his wife, and the other motorist involved in the accident. Id.
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time with him.80 The daughter's car was being used because the nanny's
vehicle would not start.81 The daughter's vehicle was covered under a sepa-
rate insurance policy than'Mrs. Brabender's vehicles. 82 Mrs. Brabender
sought a declaratory judgment against Northern Assurance Company to
determine whether any of her three insurance policies provided coverage for
the accident. 83
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals had to evaluate and interpret the
relationship of three different provisions in Mrs. Brabender's automobile
insurance policy to determine if it provided coverage. 84 The policy con-
tained a provision that stated Northern would "pay damages for 'bodily
injury' or 'property damage' for which any 'insured' becomes legally
responsible because of an auto accident" and settle or defend against suits
seeking such damages. 85 There was an exclusion to this provision that
stated coverage was excluded for "the ownership, maintenance or use of...
any vehicle, other than 'your covered auto,' which is... owned by any
family member." 86 There was also an exception to this exclusion, which
stated that it "does not apply to your maintenance or use of any vehicle
which is ... owned by a 'family member.' 87
The Second Circuit determined that these provisions could be
reasonably interpreted to cover actions of an employee acting on behalf of
an insured or to only cover actions arising when an insured was actually
driving the vehicle. 88 The court followed the principle that an ambiguity in
an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of the insured. 89
Furthermore, Northern could have defined "use" more specifically in the
contract, but did not do so.90 The court determined that these factors were
enough to require coverage of Mrs. Brabender under the automobile
policy. 91
In Rogers, the insured, Mr. Rogers, sought a judgment to require his
insurer, MFA Mutual Insurance Company, to pay for attorney's fees in an
80. Id. at 270.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 271. Northern Assurance Company of America provided homeowner's, automo-
bile, and umbrella policies for the Brabenders. Id. at 270. The only policy provided by Northern
that is applicable to this case comment is the automobile policy.
84. Id. at 271-72.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 272.
87. Id.
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underlying action concerning an automobile accident in which his daughter
was using her mother's vehicle. 92 Mr. Rogers was liable for his daughter's
actions because an Arkansas statut'93 i'npuied liability to the person who
signed the driving permit application of a minor who injured a person as a
result of her use of an automobile. 94
The MFA insurance policy in Rogers had a coverage provision that
related to the operation of non-owneal vehicles which covered "actual oper-
ation or (if he ... is not operating) the other actual use thereof." 95 Based on
this language, the court determined that actual use meant more than just
operating the vehicle and found that the policy was ambiguous. 96 Because
of this provision and the statute that imputed liability to Mr. Rogers, the
court determined that he was using the vehicle at the time of the accident
and that his automobile policy provided coverage for his attorney's fees.97
In addition to determining whether a vehicle was being used as defined
in an automobile insurance policy, it is important to determine whether a
vehicle was covered under the policy when it was involved in an accident.98
In the case of a vehicle that was purchased as a replacement for a previously
owned vehicle, it is important to examine any newly acquired vehicle
clause(s) contained in the insurance policy and determine whether the
newly acquired vehicle was covered under the policy. 99
92. Rogers v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 554 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Ark. 1977). Mr. Rogers had
custody of his daughter, but she was visiting her mother at the time of the accident. Id. An action
had been brought and settled by the other party in the collision, and Mr. Rogers was seeking
attorney's fees from MFA Mutual Insurance Company. Id.
93. The law at the time of Rogers was the 1975 Arkansas Code Annotated section 75-315,
which stated:
(b) [a]ny negligence or willful misconduct of a minor under the age of eighteen (18)
years when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway shall be imputed to the person
who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or license, which person
shall be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any damages caused by such
negligence or willful misconduct.
Id. at 329-30. The current version of the statute is codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-16-702(2)(b)
(Michie 1994 & Supp. 2001).
94. Rogers, 554 S.W.2d at 329-30.
95. Id. at 330.
96. Id. Because ambiguities in an insurance policy are interpreted in favor of the insured, it
would include uses imputed to an individual. Id.
97. Id.
98. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 486 N.W.2d 235, 240 (N.D. 1992)
(holding that an automobile insurance policy did not provide coverage when the vehicle involved
in the accident was not covered under the policy).
99. James L. Isham, Annotation, Construction and Application of "Automatic Insurance" or
"Newly Acquired Vehicle" Clause ("Replacement," and "Blanket," or "Fleet" Provisions)
Contained in Automobile Liability Policy, 39 A.L.R. 4TH 229, 301 (1985).
[VOL. 78:479
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2. Newly Acquired Vehicle Clauses
Newly acquired vehicle clauses are common in automobile insurance
policies. 00 The purpose of this type of clause is to broaden coverage to
include a newly acquired vehicle and not to restrict the policy only to
vehicles owned at the time the policy was issued.01 Newly acquired
vehicle clauses generally require the insured to provide notice of the newly
acquired vehicle to the insurer within a "notice period."'' 2 The majority
view regarding newly acquired vehicle clauses is that failure to notify the
insurance company during the notice period does not affect insurance
coverage during the notice period.103 Under this approach, the insured has a
duty to notify his or her insurance company to ensure coverage under the
policy only for accidents that occur after the notice period has expired.104
The minority position is that there is a duty to notify the insurance
company within the notice period in order for the vehicle to be covered
under the policy. 05 Under this approach, if notice is given within thirty
days of acquisition of a new vehicle, coverage is considered automatic
during the notice period even if notice is given after an accident has
occurred. 106
In Farm & City Insurance Co. v. Anderson,0 7 the Iowa Supreme Court
evaluated whether a newly acquired vehicle was automatically insured for
thirty days even if the owner did not request coverage as required by the
policy.108 The insured driver in Anderson was in an accident in a newly
acquired vehicle, but failed to provide notice to the insurance company
within the thirty-day notice period required by his policy.109
The Supreme Court of Iowa evaluated the history interpreting newly
acquired vehicle clauses and determined that the majority rule was premised
100. 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 117:2 (3d ed. 1997).
101. Id.
102. Isham, supra note 99, at 281. The notice period is "the time during which an insured
[is] required to give an insurer notice of a newly acquired vehicle." Id.
103. Id. at 299-302.
104. Id. at 300.
105. Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 509 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Iowa 1993).
106. See id. at 491 (determining that coverage would still be automatic because it would be
automatically extended even if notice was given after the insured had already been involved in an
accident, so long as the notice was given within the thirty-day notice period as stated in the
policy).
107. 509 N.W.2d 487 (Iowa 1993).
108. Anderson, 509 N.W.2d at 488. The newly acquired vehicle clause at issue stated that an
insured had to ask Farm & City to insure the newly acquired vehicle within thirty days after
becoming the owner so that it could be covered under the policy. Id.
109. Id. The insurance company denied coverage and sought a declaratory judgment that it
did not have to defend or indemnify Anderson for damages. Id. at 488-89. The trial court
followed the majority rule and awarded summary judgment to Anderson. Id. at 489.
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on mere dicta from the case that apparently created it." ° The Iowa court
determined that the case was based on cases that did not actually confront
whether notice was required to make coverage automatic."] It concluded
that many courts had blindly followed the majority rule. 12
According to the Anderson court, the two lines of reasoning relied on
by courts that have discussed the basis for following the majority view were
(1) that the clauses were ambiguous or (2) that coverage would not have
been "automatic" if notice was required.11 3 The Anderson court looked at
the language of the newly acquired vehicle clause at issue and determined
that it unambiguously required the insured to request coverage in order for
the vehicle to become a covered auto. 114 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that coverage was still automatic because if notice was given within thirty
days of acquisition, the insurer was required to insure the vehicle even if the
notice was given after the vehicle was involved in an accident. 15 The court
also noted that these clauses are not required to be in insurance policies and
that if the clause had not been in the policy, Farm & City would not have
been required to provide coverage because the vehicle would not have been
considered a covered auto. 1t 6 The Anderson court held that based on the
clear language of the policy, "a newly acquired vehicle becomes a 'covered
auto' only if the insured requests coverage for the vehicle within the thirty-
day period after the insured becomes the owner."1 17
C. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
Whether a non-present head of household was using a vehicle under his
insurance policy is crucial to determine whether he was insured at the time
of an accident if his use was required by the policy."l 8 Furthermore, it is
important to determine whether a newly acquired vehicle was covered
under the insurance policy in question if the policy only provided coverage
110. Id. at 490 (citing Hoffman v. Illinois National Casualty Co., 159 F.2d 564 (7th Cir.
1947) as the case that gave birth to the majority rule). The Hoffman court determined that "a
reasonable person reading the policy would assume that coverage would transfer to the newly
acquired vehicle automatically without notice." Id.
111. Id.
112. See id. (evaluating the history of the interpretation of newly acquired vehicle clauses).
113. Id.




118. See Thedin v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 518 N.W.2d 703, 706 (N.D. 1994) (stating
that an insurance policy should be interpreted according to the meaning of its provisions).
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for those vehicles that were considered covered autos under the policy."l 9
The important questions that confronted the court in McPhee were whether
Curtis Tufty was vicariously liable for Christopher Tufty's negligent
operation of the Toyota, and if so, whether his AMCO policy provided
coverage. 20
III. ANALYSIS
In McPhee, Justice Sandstrom wrote the majority opinion and deter-
mined that Curtis Tufty was liable via the family car doctrine.12' However,
the majority determined that the AMCO policy did not provide coverage for
the accident because Curtis Tufty was not using the Toyota under the
AMCO policy. 22 The court also determined that the Toyota was not a
covered vehicle under the AMCO policy because the Tuftys failed to satisfy
the notice requirement of the newly acquired vehicle clause. 123
Justice Neumann concurred specially. 24 He determined that the
AMCO policy did not cover Curtis Tufty for the accident and that the
Toyota was not a covered auto under the policy because proper notice was
not given to AMCO.125 Justice Neumann did not agree with the majority's
opinion that Christopher Tufty's use of the Toyota was not a "use" by
Curtis Tufty under the AMCO policy.126 Justice Kapsner concurred in the
result, but believed that contract law controlled 12 and that the Toyota was
not covered under the AMCO policy.' 28
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred that the family car doctrine
applied and that Curtis Tufty was not "using" the vehicle at the time of the
accident, but he dissented with the majority's holding that the requirements
of the newly acquired vehicle clause were not satisfied. 29 Justice Maring
concurred that the family car doctrine applied to Curtis Tufty,' 30 but dis-
sented because she determined "use" of the vehicle was ambiguous under
119. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 486 N.W.2d 235, 240 (N.D. 1992)
(holding that an automobile insurance policy does not provide coverage when the vehicle involved
in the accident was not covered under the policy).
120. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 919 12, 20, 623 N.W.2d 390, 394-95.
121. Id. 1, 19, 623 N.W.2d at 392, 395.
122. Id. 9[ 34, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
123. Id. 44, 623 N.W.2d at 400.
124. Id. 56, 623 N.W.2d at 402 (Neumann, J., concurring specially).
125. Id. 62, 623 N.W.2d at 404.
126. Id. 54, 623 N.W.2d at 402.
127. Id. 47, 623 N.W.2d at 401 (Kapsner, J., concurring in the result).
128. Id. [ 51, 623 N.W.2d at 402.
129. Id. 91T 65-66, 623 N.W.2d at 404 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
130. Id. 9 68, 623 N.W.2d at 404 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the AMCO policy 13' and because she believed that coverage for newly
acquired vehicles should be automatic during the notice period. 132
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The court's opinion focused on three issues: (1) whether the family car
doctrine applied to Curtis Tufty;133 (2) whether Christopher Tufty's use of
the Toyota at the time of the accident constituted a use by Curtis Tufty
under the AMCO policy;134 and (3) whether the Toyota was a covered auto
under the newly acquired vehicle clause in the AMCO policy. 135
1. The Family Car Doctrine
The court began its analysis by evaluating whether the trial court erred
in ruling that Curtis Tufty was the sole owner, co-owner, joint owner, or
owner in common with Christopher and that Curtis furnished the Toyota to
Christopher as a family automobile.1 36 The court applied the factors set out
in Herman v. Magnuson.137 Although the Toyota was never actually
registered by either Curtis or Christopher Tufty, the court noted that it was a
replacement for the Pontiac and that the Farm & City policy listed Curtis
Tufty as the registered owner. 138 This fact could be interpreted to mean that
the Tuftys intended Curtis Tufty to be the owner of the Toyota.139
131. Id. 9 76, 623 N.W.2d at 406.
132. Id. 90, 623 N.W.2d at 409.
133. Id. 12, 623 N.W.2d at 394.
134. Id. 91 22, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
135. Id. 91 35, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
136. Id. 91 16, 623 N.W.2d at 395. Because the determination of whether the family car doc-
trine applied was a question of fact, the trial court's ruling that it applied would not be set aside
unless it was determined to be clearly erroneous. See N.D. R. CIV. P. 52(a) (requiring findings of
fact to be overruled if they are clearly erroneous). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it was
based on an erroneous view of the law and the court is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake was made by the trial court. Hamers v. Guttormson, 2000 ND 93, 9 4, 610 N.W.2d
758,759.
137. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 91 14, 623 N.W.2d 390, 394 (citing Herman v.
Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445, 458 (N.D. 1979)). The factors set out in Herman were:
who paid for the car, who had the right to control the use of the car, the intent of the
parties who bought and sold the car, the intent of the parents and the child as to who,
between them, was the owner of the car, to whom the seller made delivery of the car,
who exercised property rights in the car from the date of its purchase to the date of the
accident, and any other evidence that bears on the issue of who is the owner in fact.
Herman, 277 N.W.2d at 459.
138. McPhee, 1 17, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
139. See Herman, 277 N.W.2d at 458 (stating that the intent of the parties as to who was the
owner of the vehicle is one of the factors in applying the family car doctrine).
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Next, the court examined the facts surrounding the purchase of the
Toyota.140 Although Christopher testified that he had actually paid his
father back for the vehicle from his savings account, his testimony was
inconsistent because he later said that he paid for the vehicle with cash he
stored in his bedroom.141 The court found this contradiction to be signifi-
cant and ruled that the trial court could have correctly concluded
Christopher did not pay for the Toyota.142 One of the factors to determine
whether the family car doctrine applies is who paid for the vehicle, and
since the evidence supported a conclusion that Curtis paid for the Toyota, a
significant factor in applying the family car doctrine was met. 143
The court then evaluated who paid other expenses of the vehicle such
as insurance, maintenance, and gas to determine who exercised control of
the vehicle and whether Curtis furnished the vehicle for Christopher Tufty's
use as a family vehicle. 44 The court found that Curtis Tufty furnished the
vehicle for Christopher's use because Curtis paid for all of these expenses
and purchased the Toyota. 145 In addition, Christopher Tufty testified that he
would have obeyed his father if he had told him not to use the Toyota. 46
Christopher's testimony indicated that Curtis Tufty retained control of the
vehicle. 147
The court concluded that Curtis Tufty had an ownership interest in the
Toyota and that he furnished it for Christopher's use because he paid for the
car, paid for the expenses, and had the right to exercise control over its
use. 148 It therefore held the family car doctrine applied to make Curtis
Tufty vicariously liable for the damages that arose from Christopher Tufty's
use of the Toyota. 149
2. Curtis Tufty's "Use" of the Toyota
Next, the court evaluated whether the trial court erred in ruling that
Curtis Tufty's AMCO automobile insurance policy provided coverage for
the accident.150 It examined the McPhees' contentions, that the Toyota
140. McPhee, 17, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.; see also Herman, 277 N.W.2d at 459.
144. McPhee, 18, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
145. Id. T 19.
146. Id. ( 18.
147. Id.
148. Id. 9 18.
149. Id. 19.
150. Id. 20-21. The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law and is
reviewed de novo on appeal. Id. 1 21. Appeal de novo is defined as "[an appeal in which the
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qualified as "any auto" under the policy and that it was being used by Curtis
Tufty to provide mobility and independence to family members, to deter-
mine whether these contentions would strain the meaning of use in the
AMCO policy.151 The court had to define use in order to determine
whether its meaning would be strained by the McPhees' contentions.15 2
In order to define use, the court examined insurance law treatises. 153
Based on these treatises, the court determined that use should be construed
broadly to include most uses of a vehicle.154 Next, the court looked to
Norgaard v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co.,155 which held that in order for a
use to be covered by an insurance policy, it must have arisen "out of the
inherent nature of the automobile."1 56 The court then determined, based on
North Dakota case law, that a person did not need to be physically
operating a vehicle in order to have been using it so long as that person
retained control over its use. 157
The court then looked to other jurisdictions to evaluate whether a per-
son had to be physically present in a vehicle to use it.158 The court used the
two-factor test from Shikuma to determine whether the non-present owner,
Curtis Tufty, was using the Toyota. 159 The first factor is whether the owner
still controlled the use of the vehicle.160 The court did not address this fac-
tor because it found Christopher's testimony that he would have obeyed
Curtis Tufty if he had told him not to use the Toyota arguably satisfied it.161
appellate court uses the trial court's record but reviews the evidence and law without deference to
the trial court's rulings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 94 (7th ed. 1999). The court's primary
evaluation was of the policy as a whole to determine whether it was clear on its face. McPhee v.
Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 21, 623 N.W.2d 390, 395 (citing Close v. Ebertz, 1998 ND 167, 1 12, 583
N.W.2d 794, 796, which stated that the court reviews the interpretation of an insurance contract by
independently examining the policy).
151. McPhee, 24, 623 N.W.2d at 396.
152. Id.
153. Id. T 25 (citing 6B APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4316 (1979) and 8
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 111:35 (3d ed. 1997)).
154. Id.
155. 201 N.W.2d 871 (N.D. 1972).
156. McPhee, 91 26, 623 N.W.2d at 396 (quoting Norgaard, 201 N.W.2d at 874).
157. Id. (citing Persellin v. State Auto. Ins. Ass'n, 32 N.W.2d 644, 646 (N.D. 1948)). In
Persellin, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that the insured owner of a vehicle was still using
it even though he turned over operation of the vehicle to a passenger because he retained full
power to control the vehicle's use. Persellin, 32 N.W.2d at 646.
158. McPhee, 27, 623 N.W.2d at 396-97 (citing Am. Auto Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 52 F. Supp.
601, 603 (N.D. Ill. 1943); Hertz Corp. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 627 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. App. 1993);
BATS, Inc. v. Shikuma, 617 P.2d 575, 577-78 (Haw. App. 1980); Royal Indem. Co. v. Shull, 665
S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo. 1984); Hertz Corp. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 250 A.D.2d 181, 683
N.Y.S.2d 483,487 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)).
159. Id. (citing Shikuma, 617 P.2d at 577).
160. Id.
161. Id. 9 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
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Therefore, the court's analysis was limited to the second factor, which re-
quired that the vehicle was being used to serve a purpose of Curtis Tufty.162
The McPhees relied on Brabender and Rogers to prove that
Christopher Tufty's use of the vehicle was also a use by Curtis Tufty on the
night of the accident.163 However, the court distinguished Brabender on its
facts because Christopher was not following instructions from his father on
the night of the collision. 64 The court determined that using an automobile
for a "generalized family purpose of providing mobility and independence
to family members" was not within the meaning of use as stated in the
AMCO policy. 65 It determined that this would stretch Brabender too far
because it would make any use of a family vehicle, regardless of its
purpose, a use by the insured.' 66
The court also distinguished Rogers on its facts because it was based
on an Arkansas statute imputing liability to the father. 67 North Dakota has
a similar statute, 68 but the McPhees chose to rely on the family car doctrine
instead.169 The court then determined that even when the family car doc-
trine applies, it does not automatically apply to the head of household's
insurance company.170 Rather, the application of the doctrine will depend
on the coverage as stated in the contract because liability under the family
car doctrine and the determination of insurance coverage are separate
considerations. 17 1 The court agreed with the dissent in Rogers and a Tenth
Circuit decision that the establishment of liability does not automatically
mean that a vehicle was being used by the non-present insured under the
policy's terms.172
162. Id.
163. Id. 28, 623 N.W.2d at 397.
164. Id. S 29; see also Brabender v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 65 F.3d 269, 270 (2d Cir.
1995) (stating that the mother had asked the nanny to bring her son to the nail salon).
165. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 9[ 29, 623 N.W.2d 390, 397.
166. Id.
167. Id. 31, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
168. North Dakota Century Code section 39-06-09 states:
Any negligence of a minor when driving a motor vehicle upon a highway must be
imputed to the person who has signed the application of such minor for a permit or
license, which person must be jointly and severally liable with such minor for any
damages caused by such negligence.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-09 (1997).
169. McPhee, 31, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Rogers v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 554 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Ark. 1977) (Fogle-
man, J., dissenting) (stating that even if there was statutorily imposed vicarious liability it did not
necessarily follow that the use of the motor vehicle was actual use by the person held vicariously
liable); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Brown, 920 F.2d 664, 669-70 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that a minor
must have been serving a purpose of his parents in order for the parents' policy to provide
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The court concluded that the word "use" in the AMCO policy was not
ambiguous and that Curtis Tufty was not using the vehicle on the night of
the collision.173 The court made this conclusion based on the exception to
the exclusion from coverage in the policy.174 The court determined that the
exception was an extension of coverage. 75 This extension covered a driver
insured under the AMCO policy when he needed to use another family
member's vehicle not specifically listed in the policy.1 76 The court deter-
mined that the McPhees' contention that Curtis Tufty was using the vehicle
at the time of the accident would render the exclusion meaningless. 177 The
exclusion would be meaningless because coverage would exist any time the
insured could be held liable for someone else's negligence while driving a
vehicle owned or furnished by a family member.178 Since the first step in
evaluating insurance policies is to interpret the contract as a whole, the
court found it unacceptable to interpret use in a manner that would make the
exclusion meaningless.179
The court declared that it would not strain the definition of an
undefined term just to provide coverage for an insured.180 It concluded that
the AMCO policy did not provide coverage for the accident because
Christopher Tufty was using the vehicle solely for his own purposes.181
coverage even though an Oklahoma statute allowed recovery from a minor's parents if a third
party was injured as a result of that minor's use of the vehicle).
173. McPhee, 34, 623 N.W.2d at 399. Curtis Tufty was not using the vehicle because
Christopher Tufty was not using the Toyota to serve a purpose for him. Id.
174. Id. T 33, 623 N.W.2d at 398-99.
[The policy excluded coverage] for the ownership, maintenance or use of... any
vehicle, other than 'your covered auto,' which is... owned by any 'family member';
or... furnished or available for the regular use of any 'family member.' [But, this
exclusion] does not apply to your maintenance or use of any vehicle which is ...
owned by a 'family member'; or... furnished or available for the regular use of a
'family member.'
Id. [ 23, 623 N.W.2d at 396.
175. Id. ( 33, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
176. Id. For instance, this exception would apply if Curtis had been involved in an accident
when he was actually driving the Toyota. See id. (stating that the exception provided coverage for
an insured's use of a vehicle owned by a third party).
177. Id. at 398-99.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Ziegelmann v. TMG Life Insurance Co., 2000 ND 55, ( 6, 607 N.W.2d 898,
900, which stated that insurance contracts should be interpreted as a whole to give effect to each
clause).
180. Id. 34, 623 N.W.2d at 399 (citing Ziegelmann, 6, 607 N.W.2d at 900).
181. Id.
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3. The Newly Acquired Vehicle Clause
Next, the court addressed AMCO's contention that there was no re-
quest for coverage under the newly acquired vehicle clause.182 The court
rejected AMCO's contention that notifying Orn was insufficient and that
proper notification would have been to contact AMCO directly at its home
office. 183 The court stated the policy did not address how notice was to be
given.184 Thus, since Orn was an agent of AMCO, he was able to act on
behalf of the company and giving notice to him was proper so long as the
notice was sufficient.185
Since conveying notice to Om was proper, the court evaluated whether
the conversation between Debra Tufty and Om on the night of the collision
was a sufficient request for coverage of the Toyota.186 The court evaluated
the parties' prior transactions, particularly the fact that Orn had specifically
told the Tuftys that Christopher would not be eligible for coverage under
the AMCO policy, and determined the only reasonable inference was that
Debra Tufty only requested coverage under the Farm & City policy.187
In addition, the court noted that Orn immediately sent a loss notice to
Farm & City but not to AMCO.188 According to the court, Debra Tufty
needed to give more information to Orn if she desired coverage under the
AMCO policy.189 Therefore, there was insufficient notice under the newly
acquired vehicle clause of the AMCO policy, which meant that the Toyota
was not covered by the policy.190 The court held that the AMCO policy did
not provide coverage and reversed the trial court's ruling because the
Toyota was not being used to serve a purpose of Curtis Tufty and there was
insufficient notice given to Orn to satisfy a request for coverage under the
AMCO policy. 191
182. Id. 137.




187. Id. 42 (evaluating the fact that Orn informed the Tuftys that Christopher was not
eligible for standard AMCO coverage).
188. Id. The court reasoned more information would have been given to Orn if the Tuftys
had expected coverage under the AMCO policy because of the special circumstances of this case,
even though insureds often have several vehicles and insurance policies and should be able to rely
on their agents to make sure their insurance needs are met. Id. 9 43.
189. Id. 42-43.
190. Id. 9144.
191. Id. ( 32, 44-45, 623 N.W.2d at 398, 400.
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B. JUSTICE NEUMANN'S SPECIAL CONCURRENCE
Justice Neumann concurred in the result, but dissented with the
majority's conclusion that furnishing the vehicle to Christopher did not
constitute a use by Curtis Tufty.192 In Justice Neumann's opinion, this
could have abolished any insurance coverage under the family car
doctrine. 93 He stated that this case did not present the right situation to
decide that issue because it was not briefed or argued. 194
Justice Neumann's approach to determining whether there was
coverage under the AMCO policy began with an analysis of the contract's
exclusion.195 The exclusion stated, "the policy does not cover a vehicle
furnished for the regular use of a family member unless it is a 'covered
auto." ' 196 Based on this, he argued that coverage was to be determined by
whether the Toyota was a covered auto because Christopher fell within the
definition of a family member, and not whether the vehicle was being used
by Curtis Tufty.197 Justice Neumann interpreted the exclusion to exclude
liability for exactly this type of situation unless the vehicle was a covered
auto. 198
He addressed Justice Maring's argument in her dissent that "your...
use" was ambiguous because if her interpretation was reasonable the excep-
tion would be ambiguous and would result in coverage.199 The exception
stated that the exclusion "does not apply to your maintenance or use of any
vehicle which is . .. owned by a 'family member."' 200 He determined that
Justice Maring's argument was not reasonable because it "exclude[d] the
furnishing of a vehicle for the regular use of a family member, but grant[ed]
an exception for the furnishing of a vehicle for the regular use of a family
member." 20 1 He reasoned that her interpretation would render the exclusion
meaningless because the exception would allow coverage for exactly the
same use that was excluded. 202 Therefore, according to Justice Neumann,







199. Id. 91 57, 623 N.W.2d at 402.
200. Id. 70, 623 N.W.2d. at 404 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201. Id. 9 57, 623 N.W.2d at 403.
202. Id. at 402-03. Justice Maring determined that her interpretation would not render the ex-
clusion meaningless because it would still exclude coverage in a situation where a relative, friend,
or neighbor furnished a vehicle for the use of a family member of the insured. Id. 1 76, 623
N.W.2d at 406 & n.3.
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the exclusion and the exception were clear because two reasonable
arguments could not be made regarding their interpretation. 03
Because Justice Neumann did not believe that the exclusion was am-
biguous, he evaluated what he thought was the determinative question-
whether the Toyota was a vehicle covered under the exception for a vehicle
furnished for the regular use of a family member.2 04 To determine this, he
looked to the definition of "your covered auto" and to the newly acquired
vehicle clause.2 05 Based on the conditional language of the AMCO policy,
he applied the reasoning from Anderson and rejected the majority rule that
coverage was automatic within the notice period.2 06
He pointed out that there was a difference between Anderson and the
present situation because in Anderson there was no effort by the insured to
contact the insurance company during the notice period. 207 However, this
did not affect his reliance on Anderson because the trial court's finding that
Debra Tufty's contact with Orn was a request for coverage was not
supported by the evidence and was clearly erroneous.2 08
Finally, Justice Neumann evaluated the trial court's finding that the
newly acquired vehicle clause was ambiguous.2 09 He determined that the
clause was not ambiguous because it specifically required the Tuftys to
request coverage under the policy. 210 Justice Neumann concluded that the
Toyota never became a covered vehicle, and therefore, it was not covered
by the policy because the Tuftys did not specifically ask Orn to insure it
with AMCO.211
C. JUSTICE KAPSNER'S CONCURRENCE
Although Justice Kapsner concurred in the result, she would have
approached this case from a different angle-contract law. 212 Her basis for
this position was that the Miller-Shugart agreement admitted liability so the
203. Id. 9 57, 623 N.W.2d at 402-03.
204. Id. 58, 623 N.W.2d at 403.
205. Id.
206. Id. 60. The newly acquired vehicle clause in the AMCO policy required an insured to
provide notice within thirty days after acquisition of a vehicle. Id. 1 58.
207. Id. 61.
208. Id. at 404. Justice Neumann did not state a specific reason why the evidence did not
support this finding, but it is likely that he was relying on the testimony of Orn and Curtis Tufty
that they did not intend or expect the AMCO policy to cover the Toyota. See id. 50, 623
N.W.2d at 401.
209. Id. R 62, 623 N.W.2d at 404.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. 47, 623 N.W.2d at 401 (Kapsner, J., concurring in the result).
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only issue remaining was whether the AMCO policy provided coverage. 213
She reasoned that the family car doctrine should not have been applied
because its purpose of extending liability had already been achieved
because the Miller-Shugart agreement provided financially responsible
defendants, AMCO.214 Therefore, Justice Kapsner evaluated this case
under contract law because coverage under an insurance policy is a separate
consideration from liability under the family car doctrine. 215
Justice Kapsner agreed with Justice Neumann's special concurrence2 16
with regard to whether there was a use of the Toyota under the AMCO
policy.2 17 With regard to the newly acquired vehicle clause, Justice
Kapsner agreed with Justice Neumann that Anderson was persuasive. 2 18
She reasoned that the Farm & City newly acquired vehicle clause in
Anderson was contingent upon certain conditions similar to the conditions
in the AMCO policy. 219 She agreed with the Iowa Supreme Court that
making coverage automatic for the first thirty days after purchase would
render the policy conditions meaningless because no notice would be
needed even though the plain language of the policy required notice within
thirty days.220 Furthermore, she reasoned that applying automatic coverage
under the AMCO policy was not required by public policy because the
Toyota was already covered as required by the financial responsibility laws
under the Farm & City policy. 22 1
The majority determined that the communication between Debra Tufty
and Orn was not a sufficient request for coverage under the AMCO




216. See discussion supra Part III.B. Justice Neumann determined that the word "use" in the
exception was not ambiguous and the policy's exclusion was meant to exclude coverage for this
type of use because even though Christopher Tufty was a family member, the Toyota was not a
covered auto. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 55-57, 623 N.W.2d 390, 402-03 (Neumann, J.,
concurring specially).
217. McPhee, 48, 623 N.W.2d at 401.
218. Id. 149.
219. Id. The newly acquired vehicle clause in Anderson stated that an insured had to ask
Farm & City to insure the vehicle within thirty days after he or she became the owner so that the
vehicle could be covered under the policy. Farm & City Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 509 N.W.2d 487,
488 (Iowa 1993).
220. McPhee, 49, 623 N.W.2d at 401.
221. See id. (reasoning that it was not necessary to extend public policy beyond the policy set
by the legislature); see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-1 l(2)(b) (1997) (requiring that every
vehicle be covered by at least $25,000 of liability insurance).
222. McPhee, 44, 623 N.W.2d at 400.
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not sufficient notice based on the testimony of Brian Orn 23 and Curtis
Tufty,224 which was contrary to the trial court's finding.225 In addition to
the finding being contrary to the evidence, she determined, without
explanation, that the policy was not ambiguous as a matter of law. 226
D. CHIEF JUSTICE VANDEWALLE'S CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred with the majority that the family
car doctrine applied to extend liability to Curtis Tufty and that Curtis was
not using the Toyota within the limits of the AMCO policy at the time of
the accident. 227 However, he disagreed with the majority that the communi-
cation between Debra Tufty and Orn on the night of the accident was insuf-
ficient notice; instead, he stated that there was some evidence that supported
the trial court's determination that notice was adequate and would have
affirmed "on that narrow ground." 228
E. JUSTICE MARING'S CONCURRENCE IN PART AND DISSENT IN PART
Justice Maring agreed with the majority's analysis of the facts and its
determination that the family car doctrine imposed liability on Curtis
Tufty.229 However, she disagreed with the majority's holding that the
AMCO policy did not provide coverage. 230 She began her analysis by
evaluating whether there was coverage for Curtis Tufty's liability that arose
from the collision due to the application of the family car doctrine. 23'
She first examined the AMCO insurance policy as a whole, particularly
the coverage provision, the exclusion to it, and the exception to the
exclusion. 232 She assumed that the Toyota was not a covered auto and
223. Om testified that he did not expect the Toyota to be covered under the AMCO policy
because it would be covered under the Farm & City policy as a replacement for the Pontiac. Id. 1
50, 623 N.W.2d at 401.
224. Curtis Tufty testified that he understood that Christopher's car was not covered under
the AMCO policy. Id.
225. Id. 9 51, 623 N.W.2d a! 402.
226. Id. This reasoning accepted the minority view regarding newly acquired vehicle clauses
because under the majority view, coverage would have been automatic within the first thirty days
after acquisition. Isham, supra note 99, at 300.
227. McPhee, 65, 623 N.W.2d at 404 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
228. Id. 66. Although Chief Justice VandeWalle did not specify what evidence supported
the trial court's determination that there was sufficient notice conveyed to Orn, it is likely that he
was relying on the fact that Orn placed a loss notice in both the Farm & City and the AMCO
policy files. Id. 8, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
229. Id. 68, 623 N.W.2d at 404 (Maring, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
230. Id.
231. Id. 69.
232. Id. 9 70.
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therefore fell within the exclusion for a vehicle that was provided for the
regular use of a family member. 233 However, it would still be covered if the
exception for the insured's use of a vehicle provided for the regular use of a
family member was deemed ambiguous because ambiguities are construed
against insurers.234
Justice Maring focused on the exception and whether the McPhees'
contention that the term "your... use" in the exception showed an ambigu-
ity or reasonable doubt as to the phrase's meaning. 235 She followed the
two-factor test from Shikuma applied by the majority. 236 She interpreted
the majority's opinion to concede the first factor, control of the Toyota by
Curtis Tufty.237 Therefore, Justice Maring only focused on the second
factor-whether a purpose of Curtis Tufty was being served during the
operation of the Toyota.238
Justice Maring stated that public policy dictated that "the driver of a
family car, in pursuit of recreation or pleasure, was engaged in the owner's
business" thereby making the driver a servant-agent of the head of
household.239 Based on this, Justice Maring determined that Christopher
Tufty was "clearly" operating the Toyota to serve a family purpose of
Curtis Tufty.240
Justice Maring criticized the majority's analysis of Rogers and Bra-
bender.241 She declared that the majority struggled to distinguish Rogers
and that the only difference was that Rogers was based on a statute
imputing liability to the person who signed the driver's permit, which was
similar to an existing North Dakota statute not relied on by the McPhees. 42
Justice Maring found Rogers was not distinguishable on its facts and was
persuasive because it concluded the statute established that the parent who
signed the minor's driving permit was a user of an automobile any time he
233. Id.
234. Id. ( J 70-71, 623 N.W.2d at 404.
235. Id. 1 70.
236. Id. 72, 623 N.W.2d at 405 (evaluating "(1) whether the vehicle was under the supervi-




239. Id. f 73 (quoting Schobinger v. Ivey, 467 N.W.2d 728, 729 (N.D. 1991)).
240. Id.
241. Id. 94 74-75, 623 N.W.2d at 405-06.
242. Id. 74, 623 N.W.2d at 405; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-09 (1997) (imputing




or she knowingly allowed the minor to operate the vehicle.243 Assuming
Curtis Tufty signed Christopher's permit, he would be liable based on the
statute because he knowingly allowed Christopher to use the vehicle. 244
Justice Maring conceded that Brabender was distinguishable on its
facts, but she concluded that its evaluation of the term "use" in an insurance
policy was still persuasive because the definition of "use" in an automobile
insurance policy should be the same regardless of the facts of the case. 245
Both the Brabender and Rogers courts determined that "use" was ambigu-
ous in the automobile insurance policies. 246 She added that the majority
cited no cases in support of its conclusion that "use" was not ambiguous,
and therefore, she would have concluded that "use" was ambiguous based
on Rogers and Brabender.247 Since ambiguous terms in insurance policies
are construed in favor of the insured, she would have affirmed the trial
court's holding that Curtis Tufty was using the vehicle when it was
involved in the collision that killed Sandra McPhee. 248
Justice Maring disagreed with Justice Neumann's statement that her
interpretation of the exception rendered the exclusion meaningless. 249 She
provided an example of a situation that could arise in which the exclusion
would take effect if, for example, a relative or friend (basically anyone
other than an insured) furnished a vehicle to a family member.250 Justice
Maring found that if these facts were true, the exclusion would not allow
coverage because the vehicle would not be a covered auto provided by the
head of household.251 Therefore, according to Justice Maring, the exclusion
would still deny coverage when someone not insured under the policy pro-
vided a vehicle that was not a covered auto for the regular use of a family
member. 252 However, the exception would allow coverage when an insured
provided a vehicle for the regular use of a family member. 253
Even though Justice Maring provided an example where the exclusion
would not be meaningless through her interpretation of the exception, she
243. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 74, 623 N.W.2d 390, 405; see also ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 27-16-702(2)(b) (Michie 1994 & Supp. 2001) (imputing the negligent operation of an
automobile by a minor to the person who signed his or her permit or license application).
244. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-09.
245. McPhee, 1 75, 623 N.W.2d at 405-06.
246. Brabender v. N. Assurance Co. of Am., 65 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1995); Rogers v.
MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 554 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Ark. 1977).
247. McPhee, 1 75, 623 N.W.2d at 406.
248. Id. ( 76.
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evaluated the public policy of the exclusion.254 The North Dakota Supreme
Court previously held that a family exclusion clause violated public policy,
and was therefore void based on North Dakota's financial responsibility
laws. 255 The family car doctrine is based on the public policy of providing
a financially responsible defendant for someone injured in an automobile
accident, and North Dakota has enacted legislation that places financial
responsibility on a parent who allows a minor to drive. 256 The majority
held that a head of household was only insured under the family car doc-
trine when the driver was using the vehicle to serve a specific purpose for
him. 257 However, the legislature has imposed financial liability on a parent
who signed the permit application of a minor any time someone has been
injured due to the minor's negligent operation of a vehicle, regardless of
whether the minor's use was to serve a specific purpose of the parent.258
According to Justice Maring, the majority opinion eliminated any possibili-
ty that a parent could insure against liability if the minor was using the
parent's vehicle for his or her own purposes at the time of an accident.259
Justice Maring then evaluated the newly acquired vehicle clause. 260
She began her evaluation from the position that a newly acquired vehicle
clause is intended to provide automatic coverage within the first thirty days
after acquisition of a vehicle to protect the insured at the earliest possible
moment.2 61 She supported her position with North Dakota case law, which
determined the purpose of an automatic insurance clause was to provide
broader coverage.262
She attacked the majority and the concurrences by stating that they
chose to follow a minority view by determining that a newly acquired
vehicle clause does not automatically provide coverage during the notice
period. 263 In her opinion, an insured does not have a duty to notify his or
her insurance agent until the notice period has expired, and if an accident
254. Id.
255. Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 885 (N.D. 1975).
256. See McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 9 76, 623 N.W.2d 390, 406 & n.3 (discussing North
Dakota Century Code section 39-06-09 which imputes the negligence of a minor to the person
who signed his or her permit or license application).
257. Id. 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
258. Id. 76, 623 N.W.2d at 406 & n.3.
259. Id.
260. Id. i 77.
261. Id. 78 (citing 8 COUCH ON INSURANCE, § 117:2 (3d ed. 1997)).
262. Id. 1 77 (citing Adams v. Bartel, 129 N.W.2d 755, 758 (N.D. 1964)).
263. Id. T 79, 623 N.W.2d at 406-07. Justice Maring added that the trial court followed the
majority view, and the majority. opinion and concurrences just "cast aside" the issue. Id. 1 79,
623 N.W.2d at 406 & n.4.
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occurs in the notice period, it should be covered under the policy.264 She
concluded that the failure of the Tuftys to notify AMCO within thirty days
after acquisition was immaterial because notice was only necessary to
provide coverage beyond the notice period. 265 She added that following the
minority approach frustrated North Dakota's financial responsibility laws
because the purpose of these laws is to "protect innocent victims of motor
vehicle accidents from financial disaster."266
Next, Justice Maring evaluated the court's holding that the communi-
cation between Debra Tufty and Orn was insufficient as a matter of law
because Debra did not specifically state that she wanted AMCO coverage
for the Toyota. 267 Justice Maring determined that Debra Tufty's communi-
cation with Orn was sufficient because all an insured should have to do is
inform the agent of the acquisition of a new vehicle. 268 She reasoned that
any other approach would be contrary to public policy and that any time a
layperson notifies an insurance agent that a new vehicle has been acquired,
it should be taken as a request for coverage.2 69
She added that the trial court had the best opportunity to evaluate the
witnesses, particularly Orn, and that Debra Tufty had no reason to contact
Orn other than to request coverage. 270 In addition, she relied on the fact
that Orn placed a log entry in both the AMCO and the Farm & City files to
support her contention that there was some evidence to support the trial
court's determination that the newly acquired vehicle clause was satis-
fied.271 Justice Maring would have affirmed the trial court's judgment
because she concluded that Curtis Tufty was using the vehicle, that the
AMCO policy provided coverage automatically during the notice period,
and that even if it did not there was sufficient notice given to Orn. 272
264. Id. 91 79-82, 623 N.W.2d at 407 (citing Badger State Mut. Cas. Co. v. Swenson, 404
N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. App. 1987); Hobby Farms v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 537 N.W.2d 229, 230
(Mich. App. 1995); Daniels v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 868 P.2d 353, 354 (Ariz. App.
1994) for the majority position that notice is only a condition precedent after the grace period has
expired).
265. Id. 83, 623 N.W.2d at 408 (citing Farnard v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 246,
248 (10th Cir. 1993); Republic Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 527 F.2d 1002,
1003-04 (4th Cir. 1975); Hobby Farms, 537 N.W.2d at 230-31; Daniels, 868 P.2d at 354;
Swenson, 404 N.W.2d at 879; and Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Falciani, 208 A.2d 422, 430 (N.J.
Super. 1965) as examples to illustrate that the majority opinion took a view that went against the
weight of authority).
266. Id. (quoting Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 532 (N.D. 1985)).
267. Id. 1 85.
268. Id. 9 86.
269. Id.
270. Id. 1 87, 623 N.W.2d at 408-09.
271. Id. 9 88, 623 N.W.2d at 409.
272. Id.
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IV. IMPACT
The North Dakota Legislature has enacted financial responsibility laws
with the purpose of providing financial relief to innocent victims of auto-
mobile accidents so that they do not face financial disaster.2 73 In McPhee,
Sandra McPhee was killed as a result of an automobile accident in which
she was not at fault.2 74 Therefore, the financial responsibility laws of North
Dakota were enacted to protect victims such as Sandra McPhee.275
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court did not review the case
based on the public policy behind the financial responsibility laws because
Christopher Tufty was insured as required by these laws under the Farm &
City policy.2 76 Instead, the court evaluated the case without regard to the
financial responsibility laws and determined that the AMCO insurance poli-
cy of Christopher Tufty's parents did not provide coverage for Sandra
McPhee's death.2 77 The court concluded that the family car doctrine
applied to make Curtis Tufty liable for the accident,2 78 and that "use" by a
family member not covered under an automobile insurance policy must be
to serve a specific purpose of the insured if that policy is to provide cover-
age.279 Furthermore, the court held that notice must be given during the
notice period in order for a newly acquired vehicle to be covered, under an
automobile insurance policy, for an accident that occurred during the notice
period.2 80 As a result, the McPhees were only able to recover $24,000 of
the $124,000 damages stipulated by the Miller-Shugart agreement. 281 The
impact of the court's holding has not yet been determined, but its decision
may be influential in future cases regarding the family car doctrine and
automobile insurance policies.
273. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-16-01 to 39-16.2-05 (1997 & Supp. 2001).
274. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 8, 623 N.W.2d 390, 393.
275. See Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 882 (N.D. 1975)
(stating "[tlhe basic purpose for the Legislature's enactment of financial responsibility laws was to
protect innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial disaster").
276. See McPhee, 5, 623 N.W.2d at 392 (stating that the Farm & City policy insured the
Toyota driven by Christopher Tufty up to $25,000 per person injured in an accident). Proof of
financial responsibility is met if a vehicle has been insured for at least $25,000 for bodily injuries
or death of a person as a result of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-02 (1997).
277. McPhee, 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
278. Id. 1 19, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
279. Id. 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
280. Id. 9 39, 623 N.W.2d at 400.
281. Id. 1 0, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
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A. DETERMINATION THAT THE FAMILY CAR DOCTRINE APPLIED
The court's decision reaffirmed that the family car doctrine is firmly
established in North Dakota. 282 The court took a strong position that a head
of household only needs to furnish a vehicle to a driver in order for the
doctrine to apply. 283 A head of household will be liable for damages caused
by that driver's use of the vehicle so long as the head of household has an
ownership interest in the vehicle and furnishes it for the driver's use.284
B. INTERPRETATION OF "USE" IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES
The court held that Curtis Tufty was not using the vehicle under the
definition of the term "use" in the AMCO policy because Christopher was
not operating the vehicle for any specific purpose of Curtis.285 The court
set a limit on just how broadly it is willing to stretch the interpretation of
"use" in an automobile insurance policy. 286 If Christopher had been run-
ning an errand for Curtis, Christopher's use would have likely been covered
under the insurance policy, but because he was using the vehicle for his
own purposes, the court would not stretch "use" to provide coverage. 287 A
head of household's insurance policy, if it is similar to the AMCO policy,
will now only cover damages that are incurred as a result of another's use of
a vehicle if the driver was using the vehicle for a specific purpose of the
head of household.288 If the head of household cannot show that the vehicle
was being operated to serve his specific purpose, then he may face personal
liability289 for substantial damages, at least in a wrongful death case. 290
282. Id. 91 73, 623 N.W.2d at 405.
283. Id. ( 14, 623 N.W.2d at 394.
284. Id. 1 19, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
285. Id. 9 34, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
286. See id. (stating that the court would not strain the definition of a term in a policy to
provide coverage to an insured).
287. Id. 91 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398.
288. Id. T1 34 (concluding that the definition of "use" would be strained if Christopher
Tufty's use of the vehicle for his own purposes was considered to be a use of Curtis Tufty).
289. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-01 (1996) (stating that a person injured may recover
from the person responsible).
290. See Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85, 94 (N.D. 1988) (stating that substantial
damages are presumed in wrongful death actions).
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C. NEWLY ACQUIRED VEHICLE CLAUSES
The court accepted the minority position that coverage of a newly ac-
quired vehicle is not automatic within the notice period unless notice is pro-
vided within that period.291 If proper notice is not conveyed to an insured's
insurance company, the vehicle will not be automatically covered during
the notice period. 292 If an injured party incurs damages that greatly exceed
$25,000, the amount of coverage required by the financial responsibility
laws, it is possible that the injured party will not recover the full amount of
damages. 293
What options does this leave an injured party who is unable to collect
under similar circumstances? The North Dakota Legislature has enacted
statutes that allow some form of recovery for a person who is unable to col-
lect the full amount of damages for injuries suffered in an automobile acci-
dent.294 For instance, some of the damages may be satisfied by uninsured
or underinsured motorist coverage. 295  In order to recover under an
underinsured motorist policy, the vehicle must meet the statutory definition
of an "underinsured motor vehicle." 296 However, an injured person is only
able to collect the lesser amount of the "(1) the compensatory damages
291. McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 39, 623 N.W.2d 390, 400.
292. Id.
293. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-16.1-11(2)(b) (1997) (mandating liability coverage of at
least $25,000 for damages due to personal injury or death of one person in any accident).
294. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-23-04 (2002) (allowing a person who suffered
injuries over $300 from an automobile accident to recover from the unsatisfied judgment fund if
the injured party has exhausted all collection options and the judgment still has not been satisfied).
295. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.2(1) (2002) (declaring that no automobile liability
insurance policy may be issued in North Dakota unless uninsured motorist coverage is provided
therein or supplemental to the limits of North Dakota Century Code section 39-16.1-11); see also
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.3(1) (stating that an insurer must provide underinsured motorist
coverage equal to that set forth under the uninsured motorist coverage statute). This statute
compensates for compensatory damages suffered by an insured for "bodily injury ... including
death resulting ... from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of such underinsured motor vehicle." N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-
40-15.3(1).
296. See DeCoteau v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 ND 3, 9 16, 603 N.W.2d 906, 912. The
North Dakota Century Code defines an "underinsured motor vehicle" as:
[A] motor vehicle for which there is a bodily injury liability insurance policy, or bond
providing equivalent liability protection, in effect at the time of the accident, but the
applicable limit of bodily injury liability of such policy or bond:
a. Is less than the applicable limit for underinsured motorist coverage under the
insured's policy; or
b. Has been reduced by payments to other persons injured in the accident to an
amount less than the limit for underinsured motorist coverage under the insured's
policy.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.1(2).
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established but not recovered from the tort-feasor, or (2) the insured's
liability limits for underinsured coverage." 297 In this case, assume the
McPhees did not enter into a Miller-Shugart agreement and that they were
awarded a judgment of $124,000 at trial. 298 The Farm & City policy would
only have satisfied a maximum of $25,000.299 Therefore, if the McPhees
carried the minimum underinsured motorist coverage of $25,000 they
would only have been able to recover a maximum of $50,000.300
In addition to uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, the North
Dakota Legislature has provided a remedy for unsatisfied judgments. 301
However, this remedy only provides $10,000 worth of damages for a single
injury stemming from an accident, and the injured party may only collect if
he or she has not yet received payment of any damages over $10,000.302
Ultimately, the head of household would still be responsible for these
damages because even if an injured party is able to recover under either
underinsured motorist coverage or the unsatisfied judgment fund, the party
responsible for the injury is required to subrogate the insurance company or
the guaranty fund.303
D. OVERALL IMPACT OF THE COURT'S RULING
The court's decision in McPhee could deter injured parties from enter-
ing into Miller-Shugart agreements if they are injured under similar circum-
stances. 304 There will be no advantage to the injured party if the insurance
policy does not provide coverage because an injured party stipulates that he
or she will only collect from an insurance company under a Miller-Shugart
agreement. 305 Therefore, a party injured under facts similar to McPhee
would not likely enter into this type of agreement because he or she would
297. DeCoteau, 116, 603 N.W.2d at 912; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.2(3).
298. See McPhee v. Tufty, 2001 ND 51, 10, 623 N.W.2d 390, 393 (stipulating damages of
$124,000).
299. See id. 5, 623 N.W.2d at 392 (stating that the Farm & City policy provided insurance
coverage of $25,000).
300. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.2(1) (requiring every automobile insurance policy
in North Dakota to provide at least $25,000 of uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage).
301. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-23-04 (2002) (allowing collection for unsatisfied judg-
ments that exceed $300 for injuries suffered as a result of the operation of a motor vehicle from
the unsatisfied judgment fund so long as the creditor has exhausted all other options to collect the
judgment from the responsible party).
302. N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-23-08(l)(a). In this case, the McPhees would not have been
able to collect from this fund because they received $24,000 from the Farm & City policy. See
McPhee, 10, 623 N.W.2d at 393.
303. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.5(1) (allowing an uninsured or underinsured
insurance provider to seek subrogation from the party personally responsible for the injuries).
304. See McPhee, 34, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
305. See id. 10, 623 N.W.2d at 393-94 & n.1.
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have a better chance of collecting from the head of household personally
than from the head of household's insurance policy.306
McPhee demonstrated that the North Dakota Supreme Court is not
willing to strain the definition of "use" in an insurance policy when the
injured party has been able to recover the minimum amount of insurance re-
quired by the North Dakota financial responsibility laws. 307 A party who is
injured under similar circumstances will only be able to collect more if the
head of household is able to satisfy the judgment personally or if the injured
party carries sufficient underinsured motorist coverage.308
The overall effect of this ruling is that a head of household who fur-
nishes a vehicle to a driver may not be covered by his insurance policy for
liability arising under the family car doctrine if the driver causes personal
injury or death to another if the driver was not using the vehicle to serve a
specific purpose of the head of household.309 In addition, a person who is
injured under similar circumstances will face the risk of not being able to
recover a full judgment if the head of household is unable to satisfy the
judgment personally or if the parties have entered into a Miller-Shugart
agreement. 310
V. CONCLUSION
In McPhee, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that when a head of
household has an ownership interest in a vehicle and furnishes it for a
driver's use, he is liable under the family car doctrine for any damages
caused by that use. 311 However, the court determined that even though the
head of household is liable for damages caused by the driver, the driver's
306. See id. 32, 623 N.W.2d at 398 (concluding that an automobile insurance policy does
not provide coverage for an insured head of household when his son was not operating the vehicle
to serve a specific purpose of the head of household at the time of an accident).
307. The evidence of this is that the court did not extend liability to AMCO based on the
public policy of providing a financially responsible defendant under the family car doctrine
because Christopher Tufty was insured by the Farm & City policy as required under North Dakota
Century Code section 39-16.1-11(1). See McPhee, 10, 623 N.W.2d at 393 (stating that the
McPhees recovered $24,000 from Farm & City).
308. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-40-15.2(2)-(3)(a) (2002) (allowing recovery of underin-
sured motorist benefits in the amount of compensatory damages not recovered by judgment or the
maximum coverage under the policy, whichever is less).
309. See McPhee, [ 19, 32, 623 N.W.2d at 395, 398 (holding that the family car doctrine
made Curtis Tufty liable for damages caused by his son, but his AMCO insurance policy did not
provide coverage because no specific purpose was being served for him at the time of the
accident); see also N.D. CENT. CODE CENT. CODE § 32-03-01 (1996) (stating that a person injured
may recover from the person responsible).
310. See McPhee, 1 10, 623 N.W.2d at 393-94 (holding that the head of household's insur-
ance policy did not provide coverage, thereby allowing recovery of only $24,000 when damages
were stipulated to be $124,000).
311. Id. 19, 623 N.W.2d at 395.
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use of the vehicle is only covered under the definition of "use" in a head of
household's separate automobile insurance policy if the driver was serving
a purpose for the head of household at the time of the accident. 312 In
addition, the court held that a newly acquired vehicle clause specifically
requiring the insured to provide notice to his or her insurer does not provide
automatic coverage during the notice period unless notice was given within
the notice period. 313
Mitchell D. Armstrong
312. Id. 1 34, 623 N.W.2d at 399.
313. Id. T 39, 623 N.W.2d at 400.
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